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The late 20th Century was witness to profound changes in 
international relations and the concept of security. This period 
underpins not only the conclusion of the Cold War and the end of 
major conflicts in several regions, but also encompasses the 
transition from the Cold War security order to the beginning of a 
post-Cold War regional security dynamic. Paradoxically, this period 
has also witnessed greater strategic uncertainty, while at the same 
time raising hopes for peace and stability achieved through the 
pursuit of new security concepts and approaches. In other words, in 
the space that has replaced Cold War imperatives and overlay, new 
security ideas and institutions have begun to emerge. Modifiers such 
as "comprehensive", "common" and "cooperative" have been added to 
the trope "security" and have entered the parlance of regional 
security planners. 
This paper explores those ideas that fall under the expanding rubric 
of "South Asian Regional Security". It considers them in the light of 
contemporary developments in the theory of social and international 
relations, primarily on the approach of collective security. A key 
objective is to focus on the fundamental restructuring of the pattern 
of interactions between the countries of the South Asian region 
against the backdrop of an increasingly complex interplay between 
geo-economics and geo-politics.  
Regional organizations today tend to be regarded as the natural 
outgrowth of international cooperation. As Bary Buzan has noted, 
the removal of earlier superimposed configuration of great power 
influence has encouraged multiplicity and contributed towards an 
international system in which ‘regional arrangements can be 
expected to assume greater importance’.1  A coherent theory for the 
new emerging regions can be found especially in the studies of 
Hettne.2 The focus of new regionalism now appears to be on the 
political goals of establishing regional coherence. As Hettne and 
others have argued, several features distinguish the ‘new 
regionalism’ from the old. Current process of regionalism occurs 
more from below and ‘within’ than before, while not only economic 
but also ecological and security imperatives push states and 
communities towards cooperation within new types of regional 
frameworks. The actors pushing for new regionalism are more 
varied, including both states and non-state institutions, 
organizations and movements. Above all, a definite characteristic is 
that it takes place in a multi-polar global context (compared to the 
bipolarity of the Cold War world), making it extroverted and open, 
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which is one way of coping with the global economy.3   
Even in regional security matters, regional organizations are playing 
an active role. The Economic Community of West African 
States’ (ECOWAS), action in Liberia’s civil war, ASEAN’s involvement 
in Cambodian peace process and Russia’s attempt to establish a 
buffer zone in the territory of South Ossetra are but a few 
examples.4 
In the Asian continent, one notices the new regional consciousness 
which has emerged due to changes in traditional security attitudes 
and frameworks. There are new diplomatic ties amongst the 
countries in the region. Thus, since1990, we have seen Russia, South 
Korea and China establishing diplomatic ties with Indonesia, 
Singapore and Vietnam. India has also strengthened its diplomatic 
ties with South-East Asia, while Japan is providing financial help to 
Russia. These new developments seem to imply an emerging 
consensus among Asian states on the eventual disengagement of the 
US military in the region.  
The South Asia region of the late 20th century was characterized by 
an incongruous blend of increasing political instability, on the one 
hand, and a cautious yet resolute fostering of regional 
consciousness, on the other. For example, the return of military rule 
in Pakistan, limited war between India and Pakistan, rise of religious 
f u n d a m e n t a l i s m  i n  I n d i a ,  
one-party authoritarian rule in Bangladesh, civil war in Sri Lanka, 
political chaos in Nepal, and possession of nuclear weapons overtly 
or covertly by India and Pakistan, appeared to have stifled any 
future optimism of internal or inter-state security in the  
sub-continent.5 Coupled with this, the post-September 11, 2001 
terrorist attack in the USA gave rise to political extremism and 
religious fundamentalism in the domestic politics of the smaller 
states in the region. This led to a spectacular deterioration of 
relations among the countries in the region. Yet these negative 
developments carried within them the seeds of a radical 
transformation in the South Asian region. The regional effort of 
knowing each other and getting together got a strong push, both 
from the developments within and outside the region.  The post-
Cold War political and economic imperatives provided the 
momentum for regional cooperation in South Asia. 
 
However, two main obstacles lie in the path of cooperative security 
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in the region. The first of these is a lingering of mutual distrust 
among the South Asian region countries. With the self-declaration by 
India and Pakistan as nuclear weapon states, the climate of 
suspicion, fear and mistrust among the smaller states of the region 
has become more pronounced. The second obstacle is the 
asymmetrical balance of power, i.e. India vis-a- vis other South 
Asian countries.  
The problem in the South Asian region is one that is general to 
regional security: The picture is quite complex, whether the region 
is conducive to, or ready for new approaches to security is a matter 
of debate. Often the security dimensions of the issue are intimately 
associated with broader areas of international relations. These 
include debate over the most appropriate paths to economic 
development, the issue of regional identity, role of regional 
organizations etc.6 In the context of South Asia, the questions are… 
How  to create a new regional security-community where none 
existed before? How can one make the leap from confrontational 
alliances to cooperative arrangements between states used to 
regarding each other as actual enemies or possible opponents?  
The concept of Security Community is often defined as a group of 
states that has achieved a condition, as a result of flow of 
communication and the habit of cooperation, where members share 
"expectations of peaceful change" and rule out "the use of force as a 
means to problem-solving. States that belong to a Security 
Community come to see their security as fundamentally linked to 
other states, their destinies bound by common norms, history, 
political experience, and regional location. A Security Community 
exists when states reach the level of confidence that ensures that 
security can only be attained if they cooperate with each other. A 
Security Community is also characterized by a) the absence of a 
competitive military build-up among the regional actors; (b) total 
absence of armed inter-state conflict; (c) the presence of formal 
and informal institutions and practices which serve to reduce, 
prevent, manage and resolve conflicts and disorder;  
(d) a high degree of economic integration; and (e) the absence of 
territorial disputes among the member states.7  
The Security Community concept was originally defined by Karl W. 
Deutsch and colleagues in 1957. Deutsch’s work represented one of 
the earliest challenges to realism’s belief in the necessity and 
inevitability of war. During the Cold War era, when international 
theory was virtually dominated by the realist paradigm, Karl Deutsch 
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defined integration in terms of turning “previously separate units 
into components of a coherent system’.  He foresaw that the 
objective of integration could be realised when a high level of 
international communications and transactions characterizes the 
‘political community’ consisting of an international system of 
developed nation-states. Closer diplomatic and commercial contacts 
foster "a sense of shared community and trust" which makes war 
between members inconceivable.” 8   Scholars like Adler and 
Barnett regard communication as the ‘cement of social groups in 
general and political communities in particular’, which consequently 
enables a group to think together and to act together’. In this 
regard, cooperative security is predicted as central to the research 
program on Security Communities. 9  
Significantly, Bary Buzan had  introduced the concept of ‘Security 
Complex’ to study regional security or what he calls, ‘regional 
pattern of amity and enmity’.10 For him, a security complex is ‘a 
group of states whose primary security concerns link together 
sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot be 
considered apart from one another’.11  This is the kind of ‘we-
feeling’ identified by Deutsch, as a key feature of management of 
regional conflict.12  Thus, peaceful change is the most significant 
aspect of this concept.. For instance, in the introductory chapter of 
the book dedicated to Karl Deutsch, titled “From National 
Development to Global Community,” the authors, Richard L. Merritt 
and Bruce M Rusett, equate expectations of peaceful change to 
security communities. 13 Thus, it logically follows that peaceful 
change is conditional; that is, not merely acquiescent, that there 
has to be a spirit of accommodation of other people’s requirements, 
not just the continuation of the past. The extent to which the 
regional institutions and sub-regions have continued to adjust and 
adapt to changes in the environment is evidently a crucial factor.  
The main challenge facing the South Asian countries is how to move 
from confrontational alliance politics to cooperative arrangements 
that include putative opponents – in other words, cooperative 
security. The aim of this article is, therefore,  
to analyze the origins, dynamics and consequences of regionalism(s) 
in South Asia in various fields of activity and combined, through a 
multi-level perspective. In doing so, I shall draw upon the concept of 
Cooperative Security which has proved to be a useful, albeit open-
ended, analytical tool for understanding the dynamics of active 
engagement in negotiations and in the establishment of peace and 
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security in the South Asian region.  
It revolves around the liberal view that there should be greater 
inter-dependence in the regional level in South Asia, to avoid or end 
bilateral, regional and even domestic conflicts between the states. I 
also wish to recast the security perspectives of South Asian states by 
exploring whether the emergence of a sense of security in common 
dealings between former antagonist states in the region could lead 
to the development of a Security Community.  
 
The Concept of Cooperative Security: 
The term ‘cooperative security’ is a relatively new one in the debate 
on international relations, in the post Cold War scenario. The term 
has been used to outline a more peaceful and idealistic approach to 
security. Cooperative security essentially reflects a policy that 
introduces measures to reduce the risk of war, not merely by 
abstention from violence or threats but by active engagement in 
negotiation and search for practical solutions, and with a 
commitment to adopt preventive measures. It is a much narrower 
concept, denoting a specific, inclusive type of relationship: 
cooperation on security issues between putative opponents. To be 
precise, Cooperative Security can be understood as policies of 
governments which see themselves as former adversaries or 
potential adversaries, to shift from or avoid confrontalist policies.14 
In addition to addressing the role of force and military competition, 
the concept of Cooperative Security now entails economic and 
environmental security concerns as well. Economic performance 
rather than military capability is increasingly seen as the measure of 
a state’s power in the international community. Moreover, states 
define threats to their security in economic, environmental and 
demographic terms. However, concerns about non-traditional 
security challenges have not eliminated traditional military worries. 
The two sets of issues combine to foster an important perception in 
many countries of a heightened sense of vulnerability. Perceived 
military deficits, a heightened sense of civilian population 
vulnerability, and concerns over the fragility of the national 
infrastructure are all part of this changed perception. 15 Before 
applying this concept in the context of South Asia, let us first have a 
glimpse of the essential conditions of Cooperative Security. These 
pertain to building an analytical community, addressing 
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transnational threats, preventing or resolving conflicts, and building 
civil societies.  
Moreover, the concept of Cooperative Security demands the 
enlargement and consolidation of democratic structures and 
institutions; political capacity of leadership; regional economic 
integration; reduction of the interventionist role of extra-regional 
forces; and primacy to the resolution of outstanding bilateral 
problems. Of course, in the South Asian region, one need not wait 
for all the essential conditions to be fulfilled, for cooperative 
security among the states. What is required is to work towards 
building the structures of Cooperative Security and undertaking 
corrective measures to strengthen the institutions which are integral 
parts of a cohesive national fabric. In the South Asian context, let us 
have a cursory look to the overall situation in the region.   
 
Cooperative Security in South Asia 
South Asia, described by Peter Lyon two decades ago, as a ‘region 
without regionalism, was not immune to the 1980’s trend towards 
regional association. This area has been 
categorized by Björn Hettne as one with a very low level of 
"regionness",16 because of the antagonism between the two major 
powers, India and Pakistan. Unlike West Europe and South-east Asia 
where the Cold War dynamics forced stronger forms of cooperation, 
in South Asia it incited the inter-regional security problems. The two 
powerful states in the region joined the opposite coalitions camp  of 
the global Cold War standpoint.  India bonded with Soviet Union and 
Pakistan did stick together with U.S. and China. Although these 
alliance appear to provide some kind of stability at one level , they 
also created the conditions for long term instability in  the region. 
India-Pakistan hostilities created a blockade for any kind of 
cooperation program among south Asian neighbors.17 
It may be noted that India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were once part 
of a single political entity - British India.  The disruption of the 
economic as well as the political unity of India in 1947 followed by 
India-Pakistan hostility over Kashmir and other issues forced the two 
major powers in the region to build divergent economic links with 
each other. The severance of political links between India and 
Pakistan in the late1940s and early 1950s was the result of political 
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decisions based on political and security calculations and not on 
economic considerations. As a result, the regional trade had dropped 
drastically. In 1948-49, the first full year after partition, 32% of 
Pakistani imports came from India while India bought 56 per cent of 
Pakistan's exports. Fifty five years later, the situation is dramatically 
different. In 2004-05, India imported only 0.42 per cent of Pakistan's 
exports and provided only 0.13 per cent of the latter’s imports.18 
Likewise, Bangladesh, except in the immediate years after its 
liberation, was not interested in enhancing economic cooperation 
with India. Even, railway and road network that once united British 
India, were subject to severe economic and political barriers after 
partition. The North Western Railway that linked Karachi with Delhi 
and the fabled Grand Trunk Road that connected Peshawar with 
Calcutta through Delhi, was detached. Natural ports were cut off 
from their hinterlands as Chittagong from India’s North-East and 
Kolkata from the western part of East Pakistan. Twin commercial 
cities like Mumbai and Karachi have become distant neighbors. In 
fact, border trade has never been encouraged by the South Asian 
states after partition. The primacy of the political factor thus 
displayed in the early years of independence has continued to irk in 
all succeeding endeavors which were aimed at promoting economic 
cooperation within South Asia.19 
Moreover, since 1947, there was continuous tension and conflict 
between the two biggest countries in the region, which led to 3 
major wars, two of which were centered on Kashmir in 1947-48 , 
1965 ,one around the Bangladesh liberation issue in 1971.  There 
were also near-war situations in 1984, 1987, 1990, reflected in 
numerous clashes between India and Pakistan. Added to it, in the 
summer of 1999, India and Pakistan fought a 73 day military conflict 
in the upper reaches of Kashmir at Kargil, located 120 miles from 
the capital city of Srinagar. The conflict was a clear manifestation of 
a 50 year-old sub-continental rivalry that has portents of a nuclear 
conflagration affecting global peace and security.  
Against the background of minimum regional backup, the then 
Bangladesh President Ziaur Rahman mooted the idea of setting up an 
ASEAN-like organization in South Asia. The initiative of the President 
has been seen as a landmark effort in moving the South Asian 
countries towards a more cooperative relationship and in giving the 
South Asia region a more visible and influential presence in world 
affairs. The birth of the South Asian Regional Organization (SAARC) 
in 1985 indicated a new beginning for the seven South Asian 
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countries of India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan 
and Maldives. For the first time, these countries made an 
institutional effort to forge multinational cooperation among 
themselves 20. 
A careful study of the objectives and principles reveals that South 
Asian Regional Organization (SAARC) was envisaged as being 
complementary to and not a substitute for bilateral and multilateral 
cooperation. The basis of this co-operation is to be guided by the 
accepted international principles of inter-state relations, namely the 
sovereign equality, territorial integrity, political independence, non-
interference in the internal affairs of the other states and mutual 
benefit. The primary emphasis was on the welfare of the people of 
the region, to improve the quality of life, through the acceleration 
of economic growth, social progress, and cultural development in 
the region, providing all individuals the opportunity to live in 
dignity, and promoting collective self-reliance among the countries 
of South Asia. The objectives also were defined to go beyond the 
sphere of socio-economic development and encompass the area of 
mutual trust, understanding of each other problems and co-
operation in international forums on matters of common interests.21 
Yet if one assesses the role of SAARC in the last 21 years, its success 
has been quite limited when compared to ASEAN, primarily because 
bilateral conflicts between individual South Asian states (very often 
between one of the smaller countries and India) prevented either 
the initiation or the implementation of multilateral arrangements 
which 
would benefit all of the members. SAARC was evolved at a time 
when relations between India and most of the member countries had 
been characterized by mistrust and suspicion. The single most 
important issue for all of India’s neighbors was how to relate to 
India, the focal point of their threat perception. This perception 
dominated issues on inter-state relations in the region, especially 
India’s apprehension about the intentions of other nations in the 
region towards it, and the other nation’s fear of India’s hegemony. 
Further, it was the fear of India that compelled the other nations in 
South Asia to search for their own separate identities, in this 
process, ignoring affinities that existed with India. 
Again, India-Pakistan political and military conflicts are the most 
important ones, in this context, with Pakistan being reluctant to 
deal with India on the kinds of economic matters to which SAARC has 
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mainly confined itself so far.2154 Moreover the sheer territorial size 
and the centrality of location of India in South Asia, have given the 
region a certain distinctiveness of character, and have mostly 
determined the inter-state affairs in the region. The size, 
population, resources and power potential of India make for its 
implicit predominance in the prevailing asymmetric power structure 
in South Asia. The Indo-centric nature of the region has been a 
major source of dissonance.2255. The fact that most of the less 
powerful South Asian countries are geographically close to India but 
not to each other, means that they are more likely to have disputes 
with India than with each other. For example, Bangladesh does not 
have cooperative ties with India, and India’s relationship with Nepal, 
which shares a porous land border of over 1,800 kilometers together 
with some of the cultural values based on the Hindu religion, 
remains trouble-prone. Sri Lanka has its own bag of problems, 
including the Tamil issue, keeping it suspicious about India’s motives 
in the island nation across the Palk Straits. Bhutan's worries are 
several, but a 1949 friendship pact prevents it from publicly airing 
its grievances against New Delhi. The Maldives' position is not 
strikingly different from that of Bhutan, except from the fact that 
Bhutan is a landlocked country and the other is a nation surrounded 
by water from all sides. 
Also, over the years, tension has been mounting between India and 
Bangladesh over the sharing of waters of their common 54 rivers. 
India, lying upstream, controls the main waters flowing into 
Bangladesh and Pakistan. And any withdrawal of water (for irrigation 
and, in the case of the Hoogly River, for shipping) affects 
Bangladesh's agriculture, fishery, shipping and ecology. Again, for a 
country like Pakistan, which relies more on irrigation and has built 
the largest irrigation system in the world, water surely could 
become casus belli. However, as a rare example of political 
farsightedness, India and Pakistan signed the Indus Water Treaty in 
1960, providing for the allocation of the waters of the three western 
rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan, and those of the three 
eastern rivers (Ravi, Sutlej, Beas) to India. 22 
Thus, India’s latest initiative to interlink some of the major river 
systems running through its territory has set off a regional 
controversy, raising the level of concerns in both Nepal and 
Bangladesh. Once implemented this Indian mega project could 
deprive both of its neighbors of their natural resource: water. Nepal 
would be prevented from making consumptive use of river water as 
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it would affect the flow downstream in Indian territory, and 
Bangladesh would find a itself dry if India goes ahead with its plan to 
dig deep canals on the upper reaches for diverting rivers which have 
traditionally been the main source of water for Bangladesh. 
Again, Nepal is completely dependent on India for its economic 
development, covering foreign assistance and crucial imports, 
including oil, petroleum, cement, and coal. Morethan 700,000 
Nepalese are employed in India in addition to some 20,000 Gurkha 
armed personnel in the Indian army. In 1989, when India cancelled 
the supply of essential commodities to Nepal as a result of serious 
disagreement between the two countries over the trade and transit 
issues, the limited nature of Nepal's economic autonomy was 
exposed. 23 
Moreover, the dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971 and India’s role 
thereof, India’s peaceful nuclear explosion in 1974, its annexation of 
Sikkim in 1975 and its intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987-90 and 
Maldives in 1988, have only added to the insecurity as well as India’s 
hegemony among its neighbors.  It was because of inherent threat 
perceptions against India and causes of conflicts like demarcation of 
borders, sharing of water flows from international rivers, and so on, 
that differences arose in the orientations of foreign policies of the 
countries of the region. Their foreign policies accord more 
importance to extra-regional linkage, which has been responsible for 
inviting super power rivalry in South Asia, thereby contributing to 
inter-regional hostilities. 24 
A study of the trends of regional cooperation in SAARC points toward 
two contradictory phases of its evolution. The first is the formative 
phase - from its creation in 1985 until the end of 1990s when one 
notices initial uncertainties, skepticism among the countries in the 
region in coming to some kind of agreement in regional cooperation. 
It also coincided  
                                                                       :12: 
with serious internal conflict in the region, such as the LTTE 
problem in Sri Lanaka and the Sikh separatist movements in India. 
This is also a phase in which an effort was made  
to formulate the basics of regional cooperation and the first 
tentative efforts at widening the scope of cooperation are made. 
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The initial euphoria and enthusiasm to formulate a framework of 
cooperation appears to have lasted through the first two or three 
summits. For example,  in the  Dhaka Summit of 1985,  a three-year 
agreement over the Ganges water sharing was reached between the 
then Prime Minister of India, Rajiv Gandhi, and the then President of 
Bangladesh, General H. M. Ershad. In the Bangalore (India) Summit 
of 1986, the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan met to discuss and 
clarify some misconceptions on nuclear issues and border tensions.  
A growth of confidence was visible in the Kathmandu Summit of 1987 
in which the delicate issue of Siachen Pass in Kashmir and the 
crucial issue of cross-border drug trafficking and terrorism were 
taken up by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. 
However, in 1989, at the time of the proposed Colombo Summit, 
trouble started brewing when Sri Lanka stated that it was not in a 
position to hold the Summit until the withdrawal of the Indian Peace 
Keeping Force (IPKF) on the island. The differences of opinion 
between India and Sri Lanka over the issue of the presence of IPKF 
resulted in the postponement of the Summit. It may be noted that 
India’s relations with all its neighbors had reached a dead end during 
this time. India’s tough stance of imposing trade embargo against 
Nepal and its intervention in Sri Lanka made a tremendous adverse 
impact in the region. Coupled with it, the increase in China’s 
influence in the subcontinent and its environs over the last decades 
- in the form of deepening strategicrelations with Pakistan, and 
expanding links with Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka, took place at 
a time of increasing complexity of India’s own relations with its 
immediate neighbors in the subcontinent. 
A second phase in the history of SAARC came about at the end of the 
Cold War and resultant changes in the global order. The phase 
witnessed an attempt by the SAARC member states to redefine its 
role. The post-Cold War economic imperatives provided the 
momentum for regional cooperation and cooperative security in 
South Asia. On the one hand, as a part of the globalization trend, 
regionalization has become a very influential phenomenon of 
integration among countries of specific regions. The policies of 
economic liberalization and the unleashing of the private sector is 
nudging the South Asian states to integrate the regional market. It 
has also called for greater and more sustained efforts to promote 
better bilateral relations among neighboring countries which could 
help develop a congenial atmosphere for financial development, 
joint ventures expansion of market facilities, transfer of technology, 
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liberalization of trade regimes, etc. at the regional level. On the 
other hand, there are internal pressures from within the region 
itself, forcing the states to act more purposefully. 25 
Cooperative Security is premised on the assumption that states will 
act in their own self-interest. After a series of low intensity crises 
and real wars, India and Pakistan have finally acknowledged the 
significance of upholding bilateral engagements that would involve 
both bilateral cooperation and conflict resolution. Moreover, the 
South Asian countries have finally accepted the fact that the civil 
wars or low-intensity conflicts in the region have to be approached 
diplomatically and politically, rather than through hostile methods. 
Through the 1990s, relations between India and its smaller neighbors 
improved dramatically. This period posed new challenges for India’s 
foreign policy.  There was a pressing need to recast India’s approach 
towards its neighboring countries.   
The quest for a new approach to the neighbors was the centre of the 
foreign policy debate throughout the 1990s, and was more explicitly 
articulated in the famous Gujral Doctrine, through which India tried 
to formulate a perspective on its relations with its South Asian 
neighbors. The doctrine essentially promoted the accommodation of 
the interests of the neighboring states, without expectation of the 
reciprocity. 
At the bilateral level, in 1998, India and Sri Lanka signed a Free 
Trade Agreement in the process of pursuing a Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership Agreement, to integrate their economies as 
closely as possible. This is a landmark treaty which was aimed at 
removing customs tariffs on all but a relatively few items traded 
between the two countries.Meanwhile, in 1996, treaties on river 
waters were signed between India and Nepal and India and 
Bangladesh.  The Government of India had also permitted transit 
movement of Nepalese cargo to Bangladesh by road via Kakarbitta-
Phulbari-Banglabund route in September1997.  
The change of attitude was reflected in the Sixth SAARC Summit 
held in Colombo in 1991. It was decided to establish  a multilateral 
trade arrangement structure known as SAPTA (South Asian 
Preferential Trading Arrangement)..  This agreement was envisaged 
primarily as the first step towards the transition to a South Asian 
Free Trade Area (SAFTA) leading subsequently towards a Customs 
Union, Common Market and Economic Union. Subsequently, the 
SAFTA agreement was signed during the 12th SAARC summit held in 
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Islamabad in 2004. . The signing of this Agreement established an 
umbrella framework of rules providing for step-by step liberalization 
of intra-regional trade in such a manner that countries in the region 
would share the benefits of trade expansion equitably. 26  The  
agreement of SAFTA is indeed a turning point in the evolution of 
South Asian regionalism and has restored the intuitional credibility 
of SAARC. It has also discussed the important issues  like trans-
border energy cooperation and even bolder concepts such as 
common currency. 
There was a spill-over effect of this on the political front. India and 
Bangladesh signed a historic 30-year treaty on sharing the of Ganga 
waters. The resolution of the Ganga water  
dispute opened up fresh opportunities for the management of water 
and environment related issues in the region. In 1997, the Chakma 
leaders and the Bangladesh government concluded an agreement for 
the repatriation of an estimated 50,000 refugees from India 
belonging to the Chittagong hill tracts in Bangladesh. It may be 
noted here that the influx from Bangladesh to the northeastern 
states of India had caused serious ethnic problems in the area.  
Earlier, in 1996, India had achieved an important breakthrough on 
the issue of the sharing of river water resources, by signing the 
Mahakali River Treaty with Nepal. Various river water sharing 
projects as well as development of barrages between India and its 
neighbors were aimed at linking the states in a network of 
interdependence, to pursue developmental objectives in the area of 
agrarian production.27 Apart from linkages through the rivers, India 
supported an initiative to establish a road link between Nepal and 
Bangladesh. This would enable Nepal to trade through the 
Chittagong port of Bangladesh. Similarly, India has also been looking 
for a route via Bangladesh to its northeastern states. There were, 
however, a few unresolved issues that existed between Bhutan and 
Nepal and Pakistan, on the one hand, and Bangladesh and Pakistan 
on the other, but that never created a major irritant issues in the 
region . 
Nevertheless, a scrutiny of the intra-regional trade data in the 
SAARC region reveals that, contrary to expectations, there is hardly 
any improvement in volume of trade. So far, the improvements seen 
in regional trade have been marginal. In fact, the success of SAPTA 
to create a free trade area in South Asia was hampered due to 
several factors like the economic and political impediments that 
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existed in the region at that point of time. 
In fact, the major stumbling blocks in the progress of SAARC and 
SAPTA have been the nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, 
followed by events in Kargil and the creation of a new war-like 
situation in mid-1999. According to a defence analyst, the alarming 
point of the tensions between the two countries on the Kashmir 
issue is, ‘it could lead to a limited war as it had triggered three wars 
in the past and the potential for such a war to escalate into nuclear 
exchange’.  In this regard, the Kargil Review Committee Report is 
significant. It states that ‘Instead of seeking stable relationship on 
the basis of nuclear options capabilities, Pakistan used nuclear 
deterrence to support aggression. Kargil indicated that armed with 
nuclear weapons, Pakistan had increased confidence that it could 
raise the conflict thresholds with India. It demonstrated a 
willingness to take greater risks in conflict escalation. Instead of 
seeking nuclear stability, Pakistan demonstrated greater propensity 
to sustain instability, by seeking military conflict.’ 28 
Coupled with this issue were others that intensified already existing 
tense relations in the region and contributed to blocking the 
“political side of SAARC “ from functioning. These included the 
return of military rule in Pakistan in late 1999 and India’s aversion 
thereof, the hijacking of an Indian Airlines flight from Katmandu and 
the involvement of the Pakistan Intelligence Agency in it. The fallout 
of these combined factors resulted in the deterioration of the 
security environment, which eventually led to the indefinite 
postponement of the 11th SAARC Summit scheduled to be held in 
1999. Subsequently the return to power of  Khalida Zia in the 
Bangladesh elections of 2001, in alliance with fundamentalists 
Islamic groups, domestic mayhem in Nepal which erupted after the 
assassination of the royal family in the region, further complicated 
relations in the region.  
A particular objective of Cooperative Security is to allow the 
regional institutions to  provide a forum for continuous dialogue, 
even when bilateral talks break down. As long as this dialogue goes 
on, there is hope that a major war can be avoided. It is here that 
SAARC could have play its role, providing a forum for continuous 
dialogue between its members at various levels – from heads of state 
down to the technical committees. 
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Finally “the conflict resolution through the pursuit of common 
programs for the future without referring to the quarrels of the 
past”, propagated by Mircea Malitza, 29 is a useful reference point in 
the case of  establishing cooperative security paradigm in the South 
Asian region.. ‘In practical terms’, as Sridharan articulates, ‘the 
approach means finding a common project that can produce 
common interests, overlap diverging interests, and have minimal 
culture, value of belief consideration.’30 In South Asia, the energy 
sector is definitely a possibility for enhancing the issue of 
cooperative security.  For example, a gas pipeline and export of 
electricity, preferably in the context of a South Asian electricity 
grid, would probably enliven economic cooperation and act as a 
catalyst  in the formation of a security regime in the region. 
With the economic agenda of SAARC countries gaining importance, 
there is a plan to build an energy grid in the region, to ensure a two-
way flow of power, natural gas and oil. The strategy is to offer 
economic benefits and open a gateway for trade with ASEAN 
countries and also look forward to a more congenial environment for 
the prospect of  cooperative security in the energy sectors.  To 
facilitate the plan for an energy grid,  SAARC set up its first-ever 
senior and technical energy committees in late 2003. The seven 
Heads of State  signed off an energy  ring and harmonized energy 
efficiency standards for the region in the Islamabad Summit in 
January 2004. 
As a major initiative in this process, the South Asian Centre of Policy 
Studies SACEPS organized an important seminar in Dhaka in May 
2004, on the follow up action of the 12th Summit held in Islamabad, 
concerning SAFTA and Energy cooperation. The main purpose of the 
seminar was to highlight the different aspects of cross border power 
trade which would lead to effective utilization of the natural 
resources and eventually would bring about large scale 
transformation in the sectors contributing to economic growth.31 
Similar workshop on the topic of “Improving the availability of power 
in South Asia : Search for Optimal Technology Options” organized by 
the Federation of Engineering Institutes of South and Central Asia 
(FEISCA) and Institute of Engineers Bangladesh (IFB) was held in 1998 
at Dhaka. In this workshop, the issue of power sharing and the 
importance of setting up a regional power grid at the SAARC level 
were discussed threadbare. This would comprise the north eastern 
part of India, Bangladesh and Nepal. Added to it, there would also 
be a Southern Grid connecting South India with Sri Lanka, as well as 
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a Western Grid which would connect both sides of Punjab (India and 
Pakistan), across the border The Dhaka declaration, held at the end 
of the workshop, suggested the creation of a SAARC Power Grid to 
ensure quality power supply in the region. 32In 2005, one witnessed a 
noticeable improvement in India-Pakistan relations, with confidence 
building measures from both sides the border. One of the major 
breakthroughs that might be witnessed between the two estranged 
neighbors is the laying of a 2,600 km gas pipeline originating in 
southern Iran, traversing through the 700 km stretch of Pakistani 
territory, before entering India. There was also optimism that this 
‘peace pipeline’ diplomacy might augment regional cooperation in 
the form of India-Pakistan collaboration, along with India-Iran and 
Iran-Pakistan collaborations, which could potentially influence 
bilateral relationships between the involved countries, on the key 
issues and conflicts of Afghanistan, Kashmir, and overall national 
security. 
The proposed pipeline would be expected to transport 90 million 
standard cubic meters of gas every day from Iran's South Pars fields 
to India from 2009-10 onwards, while Pakistan would receive 60 
million standard cubic meters. Moreover, Pakistan could earn as 
much as $500 million in annual royalties from a transit fee, and save 
$200 million by purchasing cheaper gas from this pipeline project.  
However, in spite of an eagerness for the project, the debate on 
pipelines in both the countries suggests that the proposed pipeline 
may eventually turn out to be a pipe dream, because of the 
persistence instability in Afghanistan, the geo-political quagmire in 
Iraq, and the possibility of international sanctions on Iran. Moreover, 
USA’s active opposition to this pipeline project has further 
complicated matters. 
One of the reasons for USA‘s interest in this project and the recent 
shift in its policy towards close cooperation with India, are a part of 
its tactics in countering both China and Iran in South Asia, and 
thereby ensuring that it retains its global energy supremacy. As a 
part of this scheme, the US-led South Asian Energy Initiative (SARI) 
program was set up to expand and improve access to economic and 
social infrastructure in the energy sector. The program promotes 
effective policies and agreement for cross-border cooperation on 
sustainable energy in South Asia. SARI aims to build mutually 
beneficial energy linkages among the South Asian region, including 
Afghanistan. 
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Moreover, regional politics also plays a major role in defining the 
game. As international gas pipelines have to transit through many 
countries, their construction depends on multi-country agreements 
for smooth and continuous supply of gas. The disagreements 
between India and Bangladesh have cropped up over the issues of 
India’s accusation over the issues that Bangladesh is fuelling 
terrorist movements in India's northeast, in the backdrop of rising 
Islamic fundamentalism and anti-India sentiment in Bangladesh 
under the Bangladesh National Party-led coalition government, 
illegal migration between both states, and Bangladesh accusing India 
of re-routing the Ganges and Brahmaputra river systems that 
traverse both states. These disagreements have slowed the progress 
for discussions on a natural gas pipeline from Myanmar to India, 
which will have to pass through Bangladeshi territory, forcing India 
to look into the expensive option of creating a deep-sea pipeline 
through the Bay of Bengal that would bypass Bangladesh. 33 
Here again, SAARC can play a key role in defusing tension between 
nations, and help them negotiate frameworks within which the 
governments concerned could agree on the measures relating to 
risks like political differences, terrorism and natural disasters.  
A joint mechanism could be formed at the behest of SAARC, to 
supervise project implementation and operational matters, including 
project operation, construction and environmental matters. Energy 
is a crucial matter as this issue ensures regional political stability, 
economic growth, sustainable development and security in the area 
of nuclear power. Although energy is not a highly technical field, but 
it bears far reaching political implications especially in regards to 
South Asia.  
The year 2005 was also witness to an interesting development in 
Indo-Pak relations during the SAARC Summit, held at Dhaka. Both 
India and Pakistan backed the issue of Afghanistan's membership in 
the organization, albeit from different perspectives. Pakistan 
supported the issue in anticipation of controlling trade and other 
economic activities of Afghanistan, while India’s backing stemmed 
from its policy of supporting the post-Taliban government in Kabul, 
and probably from its view of Afghanistan as a key link to energy 
rich Central Asia.  
Moreover, the inclusion of Afghanistan as a new member of SAARC 
has far-reaching consequences. Afghanistan, at the nascent stage of 
nation-building, has many expectations as a member of SAARC. 
Surrounded by uneasy neighbors, Afghanistan desperately wants to 
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end its isolation, give a boost to its moribund economy, integrate 
itself with the region, and benefit from its markets and resources. 
As a member, Afghanistan stands to benefit from the various SAARC 
development programmes as well as from any collective anti-
terrorism measures, thereby promoting its own security. Over and 
above, under the existing free trade agreement for the South Asian 
region (SAFTA), it has a better chance to negotiate a land route to 
India via Pakistan and a seaport facility in Pakistan. It may be noted 
that Pakistan has so far denied Afghanistan and India overland 
access to each other, saying the policy is linked to the broad matrix 
of India-Pakistan relations. 
To conclude, it may be said that integration and supra-nationality, 
in the sense in which the terms are used in the European Union, 
were never a designated goal of SAARC. Nor was it intended to make 
regionalism as a ‘state-led project’. Rather, the goal was to 
establish a functional network of economic, cultural and political 
contacts in the field of low politics.  
In the South Asian region, the distribution of power is uneven and in 
a state of flux today. There are multiple territorial disputes, 
jurisdictional conflicts and ethnic animosities in the region. Not only 
do the countries in the region lack experience in collective problem-
solving, they are suspicious of each other and rarely encourage their 
citizens to engage with one another across national borders, without 
their direct control or monitoring.  Given the animosity among the 
South Asian states, it s highly unlikely that respective governments 
will quickly develop a common political and security agenda.  
SAARC can play a key role in defusing tensions between nations, and 
help them negotiate frameworks within which the concerned 
governments can agree on the measures related to risks like political 
and other tensions in the region.  
As both India and Pakistan are nuclear power states in the South 
Asian region, it is imperative to have intra-governmental 
cooperation which focuses on setting up trust and confidence-
building measures, including a maritime and nuclear policy, a crisis 
prevention centre, and transparency among the SAARC member-
states to promote strategic reassurance in the region. The nuclear 
negotiations going on between the United States and India will 
surely have its impact on South Asia. Similar tie-ups are seen with 
Pakistan and China which have an impact on the traditional security 
issues. While discussing the trust factor in the Indo-Pak context in 
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the SAARC Summit held in Dhaka, Pakistan Premier Shaukat Ali 
mentioned that the region suffers from a “trust deficit”.  
Dr. Manmohan Singh went further, to say that the task is to convert 
it into a “trust surplus”.  
Coupled with the above, there are less contentious issues which 
have potential to cause a range of wider security threats such as 
refugee inflows, illegal immigration by sea, small  
arms proliferation and drug trafficking. These issues could have been 
amicably settled among the SAARC’s member-states through 
i n f o r m a l  d i a l o g u e s  a n d  n e g o t i a t i o n s .  
For example, the potentially devastating issue of illegal migrants 
from Bangladesh to India is on the minds of many government 
officials in the respective countries. However, to date, the issue has 
not been raised in any international forum, reflecting the very 
sensitive nature of this problem. Nor is there any informal dialogue 
between the SAARC member-states on this issue.  Promoting 
cooperation on less confrontational issues might build the trust 
necessary for productive discussions on security matters at a later 
stage. It is here that SAARC can help in building up a sense of 
community among the member- states in the region.    
The need of the hour is, therefore,  to  promote SAARC platform to 
deal with less contentious issues which have potential to cause a 
range of wider security threats such as refugee inflows, illegal 
immigration by sea, small arms proliferation and drug trafficking. 
These issues could have been amicably settled among the SAARC’s 
member-states through informal dialogues and negotiations. For 
example, the potentially devastating issue of illegal migrants from 
Bangladesh to India is on the minds of many government officials in 
the respective countries. However, to date, the issue has not been 
raised in any international forum, reflecting the very sensitive 
nature of this problem. Nor is there any informal dialogue between 
the SAARC member-states on this issue.  Promoting cooperation on 
less confrontational issues might build the trust necessary for 
productive discussions on security matters at a later stage. It is here 
that SAARC can help in building up a sense of community among the 
member- states in the region.    
If managed consciously, SAARC like ASEAN could develop into a 
comprehensive Security Community more attuned to the region's 
own needs and characteristics, rather than a pluralistic Security 
Community in a Deutschian sense. While the Deutschian concept of 
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Security Community is based only on the notion of security in 
military terms, SAARC stands a much better prospect to become a 
Security Community in a comprehensive sense: a comprehensive 
Security Community that incorporates, and attaches equal 
importance to elements of non-military security. This approach will 
surely build the trust that is so essential to resolving traditional 
security issues, so that both governments and the people of South 
Asian nations see each other as members of the same community, 
with similar goals of national and regional development, through 
mutual cooperation. 
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